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Abstract 
A simple measure is proposed that estimates the volume of trade distortion caused 
by  the  agricultural  policies  of  trading  countries.  The  index,  called  a  TDS 
(~rade Qistorted by eupport),  would be useful for trade analysts to compare  the 
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iii A Simple  Measure  for Agricultural Trade  Distortion 
Vernon  O.  Roningen 
Praveen M.  Dixit 
Introduction 
Discussions on agricultural trade negotiations during the Uruguay Round of GATT 
(General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) negotiations have often revolved around 
an  ~ggregate measure  of eupport  (AMS)  such  as  the  ~roducer eubsidy gquivalent 
(PSE).l  Proposals  tabled  by  a  number  of  contracting  parties,  including  the 
United States,  the  European  Community  (EC),  and  the  Cairns  Group,  have  offered 
some  form of AMS  as an instrument for negotiations  (Chattin and Wise,  1989).  The 
AMS  has  facilitated  trade  negotiations  in  agriculture  by  providing  a  common 
measure  of  support  to  agriculture  across  countries  and  products  where  a  wide 
variety of complex policies are used to provide that support. 
The  use  of the  AMS  for  international negotiations  in agriculture has  not been 
without criticism (IATRC,  1990).  Many  argue that such indices measure the extent 
of  support  to  agricultural  producers  and  not  necessarily  the  degree  of  trade 
distortion (Hertel,  1987;  McClatchy,  1987;  de Gorter and Harvey,  1990;  Roningen 
and  Dixit,  1989).  They  point  out  that  the  link  between  levels  of  aggregate 
producer  support  and  impact  of  that  support  on  trade  can  be  very  weak.  The 
exclusive  use  of aggregate  measures  of support  as  a  negotiating or monitoring 
device  could consequently detract  from  a  principal objective  of  the  GATT,  the 
minimization of global trade distortion resulting from  support policies. 
For international negotiations, it is important not only to measure the level of 
a  support policy which affects  trade  (such as  a  trade barrier)  in price  terms, 
but also to provide an estimate of the effect of that barrier on world trade in 
quantity  terms.  Such  estimates  provide  a  basis  for  negotiating  and balancing 
trade concessions and fixing retaliatory measures in response to GATT-adjudicated 
trade  disputes.  GATT  activities  include  the  identification of policies  that 
affect  trade,  an  assessment  of  injury  from  those  policies,  the  balancing  of 
. concessions,  and  procedures  to  monitor  and  police  an  open  trading  system.  A 
simple measure  that addresses all these  issues might help discipline  the  trade 
distortion resulting from  agricultural support policies. 
1  The  AMS  is a  measure of total assistance given to producers  from support 
policies.  The  AMS  allows comparison of support across commodities and countries 
even though the support structures and policy instruments differ.  The  PSE  is one 
form of an AMS  and is the amount of income  the producer receives from government 
support policies.  For details on the use of AMSs  in Uruguay Round negotiations 
and definitions of PSEs,  see  IATRC  (1990). 
1 This report presents a  relatively simple,  but practical measure  of agricultural 
trade  distortion  that  can  be  used  to  evaluate  trade  concessions  and  assess 
damages from protectionist policies.  Based largely on published PSE  information, 
the  measure  is  designed  to  foster  a  better  understanding  of  the  trade 
distortionary  implications  of  the  complex  mix  of  domestic  and  trade  policies 
affecting agriculture.  The  proposed measure clearly labels  component policies 
as adding to,  or detracting from,  the existing net trade position compared with 
a  policy-free net trade position.2  An  important argument for  such a  measure  is 
that,  as  partial liberalization occurs  in major  trading countries with  a  GATT 
agreement, it is crucial to document and encourage those policy alternatives that 
produce  less,  rather than more,  trade distortion. 3 
The  paper begins by explaining the differences between measures  of support  and 
trade distortion from an economic point of view.  A brief historical view of the 
problem  as  seen  from  the  GATT  argues  for  new  ways  of making  trade-distorting 
policies transparent.  The  paper then develops  a  simple algebraic expression to 
measure the trade distortion created by agricultural support policies.  Empirical 
estimates  for  a  few  select  commodities  and  countries  are  presented  next. 
Applications of the approach to assess trade concessions and damages  follow.  The 
paper concludes with advantages  and limitations of the measure,  and suggestions 
for its use. 
The  Economics  of Trade  Distortion 
To  see  the  difference  between  measures  of  support  and  of  trade  distortion, 
consider  figure  1  which  depicts  a  stylized  situation  for  a  small-country 
importer of an agricultural product. 
P  is the  (free-trade)  world price while  P'  is the  internal market price with  a 
tariff T  (T  - P'-P).  At  internal  price  P',  supply  is  S',  demand  is  D',  and 
quantity  (S' -D')  is  imported.  The  PSE,  defined  as  the  payment  required  to 
compensate  farmers  for the loss of income resulting from the removal of a  given 
policy measure (Josling,  1981),  is area (T*S') in value and TIP'  in percent.  The 
extent  of  trade  distortion,  measured  as  the  change  in the  volume  of  external 
trade vis-a-vis  a  free-trade  environment,  is  (S'-S)+(D-D'). 
Now  consider  a  second  PSE  alternative  in which  producers  receive  a  direct per 
unit  subsidy of T  while  consumers  face  the world price  P.  Here  the  PSE  would 
still be T*S',  but because  consumption is at D,  D-S'  would be  imported and  the 
amount of trade distortion would be only S' -So  Hence,  even though the amount of 
support to producers  is the  same  in both cases,  the extent of trade distortion 
is very different. 
What  is  the  source  of  difference  between  the  two  alternatives?  The  type  of 
2  The  operational definition of trade distortion is existing trade compared 
with  what  would  occur  if support  policies  were  removed  (a  free  trade  policy 
regime) . 
3  Trade  negotiations  aim  to  m~n~m~ze trade  distortion.  Complete  success 
means  the  complete  removal  of  policies  that prevent  specialization  and  trade 
according  to  the  principles  of  comparative  advantage.  Pending  the  complete 
removal of trade-distorting practices,  the minimization of the trade-distorting 
effects  from  existing policies is desirable. 
2 Figure  l--Comparing measures  of support and trade distortion 
PRICE 
P' 
=  P'  - P 
P 
o  S  S'  D'  D 
QUANTITY 
support characterized by  T  (tariffs,  quotas,  or export subsidies)  in our first 
example  can be labelled "market price support";  T  supports  the domestic market 
by  driving  a  wedge  between  the  domestic  and  world  prices.  Trade  distortion 
resulting  from  market  support  policy  has  both  a  production  (S' -S)  and  a 
consumption (0-0') effect.  Direct (income) support in our second example,  on the 
other hand,  affects  only  the  producer  side of the  domestic  market  (S'-S),  and 
therefore distorts trade less. 
Trade  distortion would not exist at all if producers  were  to  receive  a  direct 
subsidy  (PSE)  of T*S'  but are  not permitted to produce  more  than  S  because  of 
supply control restrictions  (the per unit subsidy to producers would be greater 
than T).  Now,  even  though  the  PSE  is still equal  to T*S',  trade distortion is 
zero  because  the  country  is  importing  the  free-trade  quantity  O-S.  Here,  a 
direct  payment  program  is  accompanied  by  an  offsetting policy  that  restricts 
production enough to ensure that trade occurs at the subsidy-free level.  Trading 
partners are directly unaffected by this policy mix of a  PSE  and supply controls 
(their exports  are at free  trade levels).4 
These  examples  illustrate that identical measures  of support  (for example,  the 
PSE)  do not necessarily yield identical measures of trade distortion.  Why  might 
this be  important for the trade negotiations?  Because  important cases exist in 
agricultural policies where the linkages between support and trade distortion are 
weak.  Furthermore,  if negotiations  are  done  solely  on  the  basis  of  support 
measures such as the PSE,  countries could undertake "policy switching"  to ensure 
4 Indirect effects on consumers  from  taxes paid to provide  the support may 
still exist. 
3 that  support  commitments  are  met  without  lowering  levels  of  trade  distortion 
(Hertel,  1987).  Conversely,  a  TDS  focus  could encourage the redesign of support 
policies that maintained a  given level of support with minimal trade distortion. 
Trade  Distortion Viewed  from  the  GATT 
The principal objective of the GATT  is to reduce,  in a  nondiscriminatory fashion, 
existing barriers to trade.  Barriers  to  trade have been negotiated largely in 
terms  of tariffs,  and  the  GATT  has  been an  institution which arranges  for  the 
orderly maintenance  and reduction of tariffs.  Tariff rates have been reduced 
through  a  series  of  tariff-cutting exercises  following various  rounds  of  GATT 
negotiations  (Bhagwati,  1991). 
Tariff  reductions  in  the  GATT  are  made  on  a  reciprocal basis.  If negotiated 
reductions in a  country/ s  tariffs are withdrawn,  trading partners losing benefits 
can withdraw  their own  concessions  as  compensation.  Calculations  relating  to 
trade  prevented  by  tariffs  (trade  distortion)  serve  as  informal  accounting 
devices  for  negotiators.  All  of  the  calculations  for  negotiations  and 
adjudication  of  disputes  are  typically  done  with  information  on  tariffs  and 
trade. 
A key problem for the current Uruguay Round of trade negotiations is that many, 
if not most,  of the  important policies  that affect trade  are not  tariffs.  In 
agriculture,  there are import quotas, variable levies (tariffs whose levels vary 
with world market conditions),  or direct payments  (sometimes  with obligations) 
to producers or consumers.  Many  agricultural policies have a  goal of stabilizing 
domestic prices which  implies policy levels that vary over  time. 
Policy instruments  such as direct payments  and associated obligations have  not 
been measured or monitored in the GATT.  However,  as the Uruguay Round began,  the 
Organization for  Economic  Cooperation and Development  (OECD)  adopted a  method 
to add up various agricultural support measures with an AMS  known as the Qroducer 
~ubsidy gquivalent  (PSE).  This  measure  focuses  on  the  total support  given  to 
agricultural  producers.  ,The  virtue  of  the  PSE  measure  is  that it allows  the 
adding of support from traditional market price support measures such as tariffs, 
quotas,  and export subsidies  (border support measures)  as well as other support 
measures  such  as  direct payments  to  producers  and  consumers  (internal  support 
measures).  For the first time,  the  PSE  afforded a  simple,  practical comparison 
of support  to agricultural producers  across  products  and countries,  making  the 
negotiation  of  reductions  in  agricultural  support  a  real  possibility  in  the 
Uruguay Round  of trade negotiations. 
Parties  to  the  Uruguay  Round  negotiations  approached  the  agricultural  support 
problem in various ways.  Since the GATT  traditionally deals with tariffs,  some 
proposals,  such  as  those  by  the  United  States  and  the  Cairns  group,  contain 
"tariffication"  schemes  where  import  quotas  would be  converted  to  tariffs  and 
then  dealt  with  via  historical  GATT  procedures.  These  same  proposals  also 
suggest that commitments  on export subsidies be negotiated separately,  and that 
internal  trade-distorting  subsidies,  defined  as  market  price  support,  direct 
payments,  and other internal policies, be measured by an AMS. 5  Other proposals, 
5Because  it is virtually  impossible  to  separate  protection  generated  by 
market access policies from those created by market price support policies,  some 
have  questioned the validity of this approach. 
4 such as  that by  the  European  Community,  advocate using an AMS  to deal with all 
forms  of  agricultural  support  including  tariffs,  variable  levies,  export 
subsidies,  and direct payments. 
From  a  GATT  viewpoint,  the  levels  of  policy  instruments  are  the  subject  of 
negotiation.  In past negotiations,  the instruments have been mainly tariffs, and 
the  trade  effects  of  tariff  changes  have  served  to  value  the  negotiated 
reductions  in policy  levels.  For  the  Uruguay  Round,  AMS  measures  are  being 
viewed as full or partial instruments for negotiations,  similar to tariffs.  In 
and of itself,  there is nothing wrong with this.  Unfortunately,  measures  like 
the  PSE  could be  considered appropriate proxies  for  the  trade  effect of their 
component  policies.  This  could be  misleading because  PSEs  do  not  necessarily 
provide  a  proper representation of the extent of trade distortion. 
Measurement of policy levels and accompanying measurement of the resulting trade 
distortion  are  inescapable  practical  requirements  for  successful  GATT 
negotiations.  The  transparency of policy levels that arises from measures  like 
tariffs/AMSs  makes  negotiations possible.  An  accompanying  focus  on  the  trade-
distorting effects of policies might facilitate the bargaining process.  To  date, 
the  GATT  negotiations  have  elicited proposals  for  measuring  policy levels via 
tariffs  and/or  AMS  measures.  We  believe  that  a  simple,  practical,  and 
transparent measure  of trade distortion would be  a  useful addition to  the  GATT 
negotiations  to highlight the  GATT  goal of minimizing  trade distortion. 6 
A Measure  of Trade  Distortion:  The  TDS  (Trade  Distorted by 'Support) 
Because  an  AMS  may  not  provide  an  accurate  representation  of  the  trade 
distortionary implications of agricultural policies,  we  propose a  direct ".trade 
4istorted  by  .§.upport"  (TDS)  measure.  7  The  TDS  would  measure  changes  in  the 
volume of net trade  from existing levels if a  country completely eliminates all 
support to the commodity.  The  TDS  measure would force a  clear accounting of the 
trade distortion caused by policies in effect.  Trade-offs could be measured not 
only in terms  of policy levels,  but also  in terms  of their contribution to  the 
removal  of trade distortion. 
The  TDS  measure is (S'-S)+(D'-D) if only a  tariff (T)  existed (refer to fig.  1). 
In most  instances,  however,  a  tariff is only  one  of many  instruments  in use. 8 
Hence,  the  TDS  in volume  terms  can be  expressed more  generally as: 
6  Another  way  of putting it would be  to  say  the  GATT  negotiations  aim  to 
isolate  interventionist  policy  effects  within  the  country  instituting  the 
policies.  From the viewpoint of trading partners, world prices and trade should 
remain  at  policy-free  levels.  This  would  mean  that  trading  partners  or 
competitors of the interventionist country would not be affected by the country's 
policies either through world prices or trade  flows. 
7  McClatchy  (1987)  discussed  such  a  measure  in the  early stages  of  the 
Uruguay Round. 
8  The  earlier  examples  of  different  trade  distortion  with  the  same  PSE 
measurement  (fig.  1)  show  why  it is  difficult  to  capture  a  trade  distortion 
effect in price,  rather than volume  terms. 
5 TDS i  qs*es*sm  - qd*ed*sm  +  qs*es*sp - qd*ed*se  +  qs*es*s1  sso 
------------------ ------------------ --------- -------
Domestic Market  Direct Payments  to  Other  Offsets 
Support  Producers/Consumers  Producer  To 
Support  Support 
where  for each commodity i, es  and ed  are own-price supply and demand  (negative) 
elasticities,  qs  and  qd  are  observed production and  consumption quantities,  sm 
is  market  support  ratio  (applies  to  supply  and  demand),  sp  and  Se  are  direct 
(income)  support rates for producers  and consumers,  s1  is the support ratio for 
all other  types  of assistance  to  producers,  and  sso  is  the  set-aside  offset, 
usually  resulting  from  direct  payments  to  producers. 9  The  support  ratios 
represent support levels per unit of commodity  compared with domestic  prices. 
The first two  terms in the equation,  (qs*es*sm)  and (qd*ed*sm),  define distortions 
resulting from domestic market support policies.  These refer to border policies 
that typically tax consumers  to pay for producer support.  This  type of support 
has  two  similar effects on a  country's net trade:  (1)  a  production effect under 
which higher producer prices and more  production imply more  exports and/or less 
imports,  leading  to  more  net  exports  (exports-imports)  and  greater  trade 
distortions  (S'-S  in fig.  1),  and  (2)  a  consumption effect under  which  higher 
consumer prices  and less  consumption lead to more  net exports  and  larger trade 
distortions  (D'-D  in fig.  1).  Hence,  if tariff T  (or the equivalent quota of T 
=  D'-S')  were  the  only  operative policy  instrument,  then  the  trade  distortion 
would be  represented by  (S'-S)+(D-D'). 
The  third  (qs*es*sp)  and  fourth  (qd*ed*Se)  terms  define  distortions  created by 
direct  payments  to  producers  and  consumers,  respectively,  by  the  government 
(taxpayer).  This type of payment has different net trade effects depending upon 
whether  and  how  much  the  producer  or  consumer  benefits  from  the  policy. 
Payments  to  producers  raise  incentive  prices,  encouraging  production  and 
generating more exports and/or less imports  (increasing net exports).  Payments 
to consumers,  on the other hand,  raise consumption and discourage exports and/or 
encourage  imports  (decreasing net exports). 
The  fifth  term  in the  equation,  (qs*es*s1),  defines  distortions  created by all 
other  types  of  support  to  producers.  This  includes  policies  such  as  input 
subsidies,  infrastructural  investments,  and  research  and  development 
expenditures.  Such  policies  normally  encourage  production  and  generate  more 
exports  and  less  imports.  Our  approach  assumes  that  the  incidence  of 
intervention for  (producer)  income  support  and  input assistance  are  the  same, 
implying  that  equivalent  levels  of  support  for  s1  and  sp  result  in  identical 
production effects. 10 
The  final  term  (sso)  refers to policies which offset trade distortions.  These 
9PSEs  and  CSEs  published by  the  USDA  (1990)  and the  OECD  (country studies 
and monitoring reports) are disaggregated into various policy components.  Market 
support  (price  intervention)  and  direct  income  support  are  two  such  elements. 
Others  include  input assistance,  economywide policies,  and regional policies. 
lOIf policies relating to input subsidies,  infrastructural investments,  and 
research and development were to be excluded from negotiations,  this term in the 
equation could be  dropped. 
6 are  policies  that  require  production  or  consumption  disciplines  in  order  for 
producers  and/or  consumers  to  be  eligible  to  receive  direct  payments. 11 
Offsetting policies discourage production and exports or encourage imports.  The 
result is less net exports. 
The  TDS  defined above is a  volume measure of trade distortion created by specific 
forms  of  government  intervention  for  a  given  year,  country,  and  commodity. 
Jos1ing  (1991)  points out that for a  measure to be "desirable," it should,  among 
other things, be comparable over time,  commodities, policies, and countries.  The 
TDS  as defined above facilitates comparisons over policies and countries but not 
necessarily  over  commodities.  One  simple  means  of  making  the  TDS  a  more 
appealing instrument for making comparisons across commodities  is to express it 
in  percentage  form.  An  index  that  measures  the  ~e1ative  ~rade gistorted  by 
~upport (RTDS)  for  commodity  i  may  be  expressed as: 
RTDS i  - TDSi/{[(Subsidy-free production)i +  (Subsidy free  consumption)i]/2) 
where,  TDS  is the volume of trade distorted by support,  subsidy-free production 
is the production that would exist if the country did not have  any  support and 
is  defined  as  (qs  +  qs*es*sm  +  qs*es*sp  - qs*es*si  - sso),  and  subsidy-free 
consumption is similarly defined as  (qd  +  qd*ed*sm  - qd*ed*sc).12  The  RTDS  index 
measures  the  distortion  in  a  country's  trade  relative  to  its  subsidy-free 
domestic  market. 13  It does  not  tell us  the  country's  contribution  to  global 
trade distortion.  In other words,  identical RTDSs  across countries suggest that 
each country's trade is equi-proportionate1y distorted, not that they contribute 
equally to global distortion. 
Another  way  to  compare  distortion across  commodities  is  to  convert  the  volume 
measure  of TDS  to  a  common  currency.  This ya1ue  of ~rade gistorted by  ~upport 
(VTDS)  is obtained by multiplying the TDS  by the world (border)  price.  The  VTDS 
measure,  as will be shown later,  can also be used to assess damages  to the rest-
of-the-wor1d resulting from  a  country's domestic  and  trade policies.  Constant 
currency conversion rates could be used to make  comparisons across time in "real" 
terms.  Exchange rate conversion to dollars would facilitate comparisons across 
countries. 
The  TDS  measures  the  first  round  effects  on  world  markets  from  a  removal  of 
support for  a  single commodity.  It does not reflect cross-commodity effects nor 
the feedback world price effects.  A more complete means of calculating the trade 
distortions caused by policies would be to use the AMS  and set-aside measures in 
a  mu1ticountry,  mu1ticommodity  world  agricultural  trade  model  with  the 
11  There are many  approaches  one  could take  to calculate 
production/consumption offsets.  Haley,  Herlihy,  and Johnston  (1991) 
illustrate one  method to obtain estimates for u.s.  land set-aside programs. 
12Choice of the normalization factor is based on the need to account for the 
size of a  country/sector as well as the need to prevent the index from collapsing 
to zero  or becoming undefined as  trade volumes  approach zero. 
13  In terms  of figure  1,  RTDS  - [(S'-S)  +  (D'-D)]/[(S+D)/2]. 
7 appropriate  parameters. 14  This  has  in fact been  done  in  a  number  of  studies, 
including Tyers and Anderson (1986),  DECD  (1987a),  and Roningen and Dixit (1989). 
While  these empirical studies may  have used a  conceptually superior approach to 
calculating  the  trade  distortion arising  from  support,  most  policymakers  and 
negotiators  are unlikely  to  rely extensively  on  a  modeling  framework  in trade 
negotiations.  Negotiators  typically  focus  only  on  the  first round  effects of 
policy  changes  in  assessing  trade  concessions  and  injuries.  Under  these 
circumstances,  it is judicious to devise a  measurement  system that is simple to 
use  and yet reasonably accurate.  The  TDS  meets  these criteria,  thus  making it 
a  useful  tool  to  help  policymakers  and  negotiators  gauge  the  distortionary 
implications of policies with existing data without resorting to a  large economic 
model. 15 
Empirical Examples  of TDS  Estimates 
Several  types  of data are  needed  to  calculate  the  TDS  measure:  production and 
consumption  data,  PSE  and  CSE  information  disaggregated  into  market  support 
policies  and  direct  payments,  information  on  policies  that  offset  trade 
distortions  such  as  supply  or  consumption  control  schemes,  and  own-price 
elasticities  of  supply  and  demand.  Policy  support  and  quantity  data  are 
published  in various  DECD  country  and  monitoring  reports  (DECD,  1990;  DECD, 
1987a;  DECD,  1987b).  Elasticity estimates and supply control information match 
those used in USDA's  SWDPSIM  model  (Sullivan,  Wainio,  and Roningen,  1989).  The 
same  own-price  elasticity  estimate--the  production  or  consumption  weighted 
average of own-price elasticities for  DECD  countries--was used across countries 
for each  commodity.16 
14An  AMS,  in contrast to a  TDS,  does not contain an estimate of the subsidy 
equivalent of production control measures.  In terms of the analytical framework 
in figure 1,  the TDS  accounts for this additional  (domestic)  policy-based shift 
in the  supply schedule. 
15That  is  not  to  say  a  model  is  not  useful  for  the  calculation  of  full 
economic  effects resulting from  a  trade negotiation.  Even if a  TDS  measure  is 
calculated,  a  full modeling of the  information will be  useful.  But  there  are 
many  cases where it is practical to do  simple calculations with existing data, 
particularly at a  detailed commodity  level.  The  performance  of the  simple  TDS 
measure  is  gauged  by  comparing  TDS  estimates  with  more  complex  model  results 
later in this report. 
16  Supply  and  demand  elasticities  tend  to be  similar  for  models  of major 
trade countries.  Since the elasticities serve as weights for adding up the trade 
effects from  "supply"  and "demand"  changes,  the assumption of identical weights 
greatly simplifies  the calculation process.  Then,  differences  in TDS  measures 
do  not derive  from elasticity assumptions. 
8 Figure  2--Program components  of the U.S.  TDSfor wheat 
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TDS  measures  were  calculated  for' the  l3-commodity,  II-country  PSE  data  set 
published  by  the  DECD  (DECD,  1991).  For  illustrative  purposes,  however,  we 
focused  only on wheat  and sugar estimates for  1989/90,  the last year for which 
published data were available.  Empirical estimates for other commodities in  the 
DECD  data set are provided in Appendix  1. 
Figure  2  shows  how  the  components  of  U.S.  programs  affect  the 
production/consumption and therefore the net trade distortion of wheat.  In this 
example,  the net TDS  (a negative number quantity of trade distorted by support) 
is  a  sum  of the  positive  and negative  components.  For wheat,  U.S.  set-asides 
offset  other  parts  of  the  programs  such  as  direct  deficiency  payments  to 
producers  and market  support via the export enhancement  program  (EEP). 
TDS  Estimates  for Wheat 
Figure 3  shows TDS  estimates for the United States and other DECD  countries.  The 
estimates indicate that U. S. policies distort the world wheat market very little, 
if any,  compared to other countries. 17  EC  policies,  on the other hand,  distort 
wheat trade  (16 million metric tons)  more  than the combined effects of all other 
countries  shown  in figure  3.  This  large difference between U.S.  and  EC  wheat 
trade distortion occurs because of the different structure of support policies 
17A  negative  TDS  indicates  that  the  country's  policies  help  off-set  the 
trade distortion created by policies of other countries.  Put differently,  the 
country's policies  raise rather  than depress  world prices  because  the  country 
contracts  trade  (net exports)  below its free-trade  level. 
9 Figure  3--Policy contributions to the  TDS  for wheat 
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in the two countries.  A market support policy that affects both consumption and 
production by reducing net imports is a  major element of EC  policies while direct 
income  support policy,  which distorts only production,  is the mainstay of U.S. 
policies.  U.S.  programs also include set-asides which offset trade distortion, 
but no  such provision exists  for  EC  wheat  programs.  Almost  the entire  trade-
distorting  effect  from  U.S.  price 
and  income  support  policies  are 
offset  by  set-aside  requirements, 
making  the  U.S.  wheat  program 
trade-neutral in 1989/90. 
These  results  also  show  the 
importance  of  distinguishing 
between  measures  of  support  and 
dis  tortion.  Figure  4  shows  the 
distribution of  the  total  TDS  for 
wheat  trade  in  1989/89  among 
several  DECD  countries.  While  the 
United  States  accounts  for  20 
percent  of  wheat  support,  it 
contributed  none  of  the  trade 
distortion  created  by  these  DECD 
countries.  In fact,  U.S.  programs 
offset the  trade distortion caused 
by  other  DECD  countries.  The  EC, 
Figure 4--Share of trade distortion and 
producer  support for wheat 
Percent of Total for Countries Shown 
80r--------------------------------. 
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10 on  the  other  hand,  accounted  for 
nearly 60 percent of total support, 
but generated nearly 75  percent of 
the total trade distortion. 
That  the  PSE  might  not  be  a  good 
approximation  for  the  levels  of 
trade  distortion  is  also  apparent 
from  the  RTDS  index  (fig.  5).  The 
RTDS  index,  as  mentioned  earlier, 
normalizes  the  volume  of  a 
country's  trade  distortion by  the 
size  of  the  subsidy-free  domestic 
market.  A  comparison  of  the  RTDS 
wheat  index  for  the  United  States 
and  the  EC  with  the  corresponding 
PSE  measure  shows  large 
discrepancies  between  the  two 
Figure  5--Comparison of  PSEs  and 
RTDs  for wheat 
Percent 
70r=~~---------------------------. 
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Source: Calculated from OECD reports. 
measures.  The  RTDS  index  indicates  that  EC  wheat  policies  were  much  more 
distortionary (25.6 percent)  in 1989/90 than U.S.  policies  (-1.8 percent),  even 
though  the  wheat  PSE  rates  for  both  economies  are  roughly  similar  (15-20 
percent). 
TDS  Estimates for  Sugar 
PSEs  provide  a  reasonable  measure  of  a  country's  trade  distortion  when  that 
country's  contributions  to  trade  distortion are very  similar  to  its shares  of 
support  (fig.  6).  To  see  this,  consider  the case of sugar. 
Both  the  United  States  and  the  EC  Figure  6--Share of trade distortion and 
use  market  support  policies  to 
assist  producers,  and  neither  use 
direct  income  support  or  other 
policies  that  offset  trade 
distortion (fig. 7).  Trading units 
like  the  EC  and  the  United  States 
provide  the  largest  share  of 
support  to  their  sugar  producers 
and  distort world  trade  the  most. 
On  the  other  hand,  countries  like 
Sweden  and  Austria  account  for  a 
small  share  of  total  support  and 
distort the market  the least.  In 
the  case  of  some  commodities  such 
as  sugar where  only market  support 
policies exist,  the  PSEs  appear  to 
provide  a  reasonably  accurate 
ranking  of  the  degree  of  trade 
distortion.  However,  the  TDS  is 
producer  support for  sugar 
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generally  a  better  measure  of  distortion  for  all 
consistently accounts  for all policies affecting trade. 
commodities  since  it 
Some  of this same information is also reflected in summary form in the RTDS  index 
for sugar (fig.  8).  The  RTDS  sugar indices for the United States and the  EC  are 
broadly  comparable  to  the  corresponding  PSEs.  This  holds  for  most  other 
countries as well.  Remember,  however,  that the RTDS  measures only the relative 
11 Figure  7--Policy contributions to the  TDS  for  sugar 
Million metric tons - (* TDS for sugar) 
5~-------------------------------------------. 
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distortion  in  a  country's  trade, 
and not its contribution to global 
trade  distortion.  Consequently, 
high  levels  of  the  RTDS  index  for 
small countries  such as  Sweden  and 
Austria  do  not  mean  that  they 
distort world  sugar  trade  as  much 
as  the  EC  and  the  United  States, 
just that  the  distortion  in  trade 
relative to their domestic markets 
are equi-proportionate. 
What  can  be  concluded  from  these 
comparisons?  AMSs  such  as  PSEs, 
while  a  reasonable  measure  of 
agricultural support to producers, 
are not necessarily appropriate as 
a  measure  of  trade  distortion. 
Their  use  to  measure  trade 
Figure 8--Comparison of  PSEs  and 
RTDs  for  sugar 
Percent 
70~------------------------------~ 
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distortions is highly questionable  in situations where  countries pursue  a  wide 
variety  of policies,  particularly  those  involving  direct  payments  and  supply 
controls. 
12 The  TDS  as  a  Trade Distortion Monitoring  Device 
In trade negotiations, it is often not sufficient to establish initial levels of 
acceptable  support  or distortion for  a  commodity.  Rather,  it is essential  to 
monitor  changes  in  levels  of  distortion  over  time.  After  all,  negotiations 
seldom lead to a  complete and instantaneous  removal of barriers,  and choosing a 
base  period  from  which  to  measure  levels  of  distortion  can  be  an  important 
element of the negotiation and  compliance process. 
Since the TDS  is a  volume measure of trade distortion, it can measure distortion 
over time  and countries for  a  commodity.  The  RTDS  measure,  on the other hand, 
is  a  unit-free  measure  of  distortion  and  lends  itself to  cross-commodity  and 
intertempora1 comparisons.  It also takes into account the size of the domestic 
market  and  could  be  especially  appealing  to  countries  seeking  an  equitable 
burden-sharing scheme  to reduce  trade distortion.  Finally,  the RTDS  takes  into 
account  the  uncertainties  in  agricultural  production  by  normalizing  trade 
distortion by  the  size of the  domestic  sector. 
To  use  the  RTDS  measure  as  a  distortion monitoring  instrument  over  time  for  a 
given commodity,  calculate  the  RTDS  for  each year  assuming that the  supply and 
demand parameters remain the same.  This isolates the trade effects of the levels 
and/or  types  of  policies,  and  also  isolates  trade  differences  resulting  from 
changes  in supply and demand parameters.  Using U.S.  wheat as an example,  while 
levels of PSEs  rose during 1980-87,  the RTDS  index was actually negative in 4  of 
the  8  years  (fig.  9).  Even  though  total  support  to  wheat  producers  rose  as 
Figure  9--Wheat  PSE  and  RTDS  for  the United States and  the  EC,  1980-90 
Percent 
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13 
1990 measured  by  the  PSE,  the  policy  mix  was  a1 tered  to  produce  a  much  lower 
distortionary  effect  than  implied  by  the  PSEs.  For  the  EC,  however,  the 
increases in the RTDS  index between 1980 and 1987 were relatively larger than the 
corresponding increases  in PSEs,  indicating that changes  in EC  policies during 
this time period led to greater distortionary effect than suggested by the PSEs. 
Keeping  track  of  changes  in  distortion  can  be  an  important  element  of 
negotiations  even if concessions were  to be  traded on  the basis of AMSs. 
Another  advantage  of the  RTDS  is that it allows  the extent of trade distortion 
to be monitored across different sectors within the agricultural economy.  This 
information could be useful for countries seeking to harmonize distortions across 
products .18  Our  analysis  indicates  that  distortionary  implications  of  U. S. 
policies vary widely across  commodity  groups,  being  low  for  crops  and high  for 
livestock products (table 1).  The distortionary implications for the EC  are much 
more  uniform,  with less distinction between crops  and livestock. 
Table  1-- Relative  trade distorting support  (RTDS), 
by sectors,  1989/90 
Commodities  United  EC  Canada  Japan  Australia 
States 
Percent 
Wheat  -1. 8  25.8  24.2  159.2  NC 
Coarse  grains  5.3  53.9  24.5  411.5  NC 
Rice  12.1  76.3  NC  228.2  7.2 
Soybeans  .6  9.6  .2  15.3  NC 
Other oi1seeds  NC  43.0  13.0  NC  NC 
Sugar  33.9  38.4  16.9  54.2  3.2 
Milk  53.0  61.2  69.7  104.7  20.8 
Beef and veal  37.5  91.6  47.1  111.9  NC 
Pork  -1.0  22.6  21.5  170.3  NC 
Poultry  1.1  54.1  26.3  17.1  NC 
NC  - not calculated. 
The  TDS  as  a  Tool for Trade  Disputes  and  Trade  Negotiations 
Damage  or  ~nJury assessment  is  a  crucial  element  of  any  international  trade 
dispute  settlement  process.  Numerous  cases  have  been  filed  at  the  GATT  for 
ruling on  the  damage  or  injury incurred by  the petitioning country's  commerce 
from policies of other countries.  Australia won  a  ruling in 1990 that U. S.  sugar 
quotas  were  GATT-illegal  and  cost  Australia  export  earnings.  A  GATT  panel 
similarly  found  that  the  EC  subsidies  to producers  and processors  of oi1seeds 
violated GATT  codes  and discriminated against oilseed imports.  Altogether,  76 
cases  were  petitioned before  the  GATT  between  1980  and  1988  seeking ruling on 
unfair trading practices.  A majority of the complaints referred to  the use  of 
unfair  trade  and  domestic  policy  instruments  in  agriculture  and  agricu1ture-
related sectors  (Bhagwati,  1991). 
There are numerous ways  in which one could assess damages  in dispute settlement 
cases.  Trend analysis  and  elaborate modeling  are  two  such  approaches.  Trend 
18  Harmonization  of  support  has  been  a  goal  of  the  EC  and  was  a  driving 
force behind the  1990 U.S.  farm legislation. 
14 analysis,  while  simple,  does  not  isolate  the  effects  of  policies  on  trade; 
instead,  it includes  the effect of all factors  affecting trade during the  time 
period under consideration.  An  elaborate modeling exercise,  on the other hand, 
takes considerable time and financial resources  and may  not be very transparent 
to parties in a  dispute. 
The  TDS  has  advantages  in  cost,  time,  and  transparency  over  these  other 
approaches,  making it a  far more  reasonable and useful tool in settlement cases 
to assess  damages  and establish compensation requirements.  This  can be  done  by 
converting  the  TDS  to  a  measure  of  the  yalue  of !rade gistorted  by  ~upport 
(VTDS),  using relevant world prices.  The VTDS  can be calculated for the injured 
sector,  and  used  to  assess  the  countervailing  tariffs  required  to  obtain 
compensatory benefits  in some  other sectors. 
The recent U. S.  and EC  oilseeds dispute provides an opportunity to illustrate the 
use  of  the  VTDS .19  The  United  States  contends  that  EC  subsidies  to  oilseed 
processors  have  systematically curtailed U.S.  soybean exports  to  the  EC.  The 
VTDS  measure  indicates that such subsidies prevented oilseed imports valued at 
$800  million  dollars  annually  from  entering  the  EC  between  1987  and  1989. 
Because  the  United  States  accounted  for  roughly  one-third  of  the  EC  market, 
assume  that one-third of  the  trade  damage,  or  $250  million,  was  borne  by  the 
United  States.  This  VTDS  measure  then  could  then  be  used  to  estimate  the 
countervailing tariffs that would be  imposed on  EC  wine,  for example,  to recoup 
the lost U.S.  export earnings. 
Limitations of the  TDS  Measure 
The  TDS  measure shares  two principal limitations with AMSs  when compared with a 
more elaborate modeling approach: 2o  (1)  changes in world prices that result from 
removal  of  policies  are  ignored,  and  (2)  cross-commodity  effects  of  policy 
elimination are not  included. 
To  estimate  the  importance  of  these  limitations,  the  SVlOPSIM  (ST89  version) 
modeling framework calculated RTDS  indices using both a  single-commodity,  world 
19For  details  on  the exact nature of the dispute,  see  GATT  (1990). 
20  The  argument  here  is  that  some  support  to  agriculture  simply  offsets 
other countries' support and should not be counted.  But if reductions in support 
actually are carried out,  those world price improvements are received by all as 
partial  compensation  for  concession  given.  As  a  practical  matter,  however, 
concessions have the same market price effect for everyone,  eliminating the need 
to negotiate over a  gift received equally by all. 
15 model  (SRTDS)  and a  multicommodity, world model  (MRTDS).  The  SRTDS  measure takes 
into account the world price feedback effects while the MRTDS  index incorporates 
both the world price feedback and the cross-commodity implications.  Comparison 
of the  indices  then allows  the  respective effects  to be  isolated. 
World  Price Feedback Effects 
To  examine  the effects that world price changes  could have  on  the  TDS,  single-
commodity world models  were  constructed for  each  commodity.  Then,  the  PSE  and 
CSE  were  unilaterally removed  in each  country,  holding policies  for  all other 
countries constant.  The ratio of the absolute change in net trade to the average 
of subsidy-free production and consumption from the modeling exercise (SRTDS)  was 
then compared to  the calculated RTDS  index,  and their difference is attributed 
to  changes  in world price. 
The  results indicate that the  RTDS  indices for the United States and the  EC  are 
generally higher than the corresponding SRTDS  indices estimated from the modeling 
framework (table 2).  This is because elimination of support in the United States 
and  the  EC  raises  world  prices  and  increases  production  (denominator  term  in 
SRTDS)  above  levels that would have  prevailed with fixed world prices.  In the 
case of sugar,  the percentage declines  in distortion in each region as  a  result 
of world  price  changes  are  approximately  the  same  (6  percent).  This  pattern 
holds  for wheat,  but not quite as  strongly. 
Not surprisingly, the differences between the RTDS  and the SRTDS  indices are very 
small for both sugar and wheat for most other countries.  This  is because these 
other  countries  are  small  actors  in global  sugar  and  wheat  markets  and  their 
policies minimally affect world prices.  Hence,  ignoring changes  in world price 
may  not bias  a  small  country's  measure  of distortion but may  overestimate  the 
extent of distortion attributable to  large countries. 
Cross-Commodity Effects 
To  study the effect that cross-commodity effects may  have on the TDS  measure,  we 
used the full 22-commodity version of ST89  with support unilaterally eliminated 
for each commodity in each country.  The  results indicate that the consequences 
of introducing cross-commodity effects are minimal:  the RTDS  indices with cross-
commodity effects (MRTDS)  are no different than the corresponding indices without 
cross-price effects  (SRTDS)  (table 2).  This  is true for  the  EC  and  the United 
States. 
The  similarity  occurs  for  a  number  of  reasons.  One  is  the  use  of  an 
intermediate-run  model  in  which  the  substitution  relationships  are  not  very 
large.  Another  reason is that for  a  price change  to have  a  meaningful  impact, 
it must  be  large  enough  to  affect  the  global  market  and  feed  back  into  the 
domestic market.  Third,  the  economic  structure of the  farm sectors within the 
OECD  countries  are  broadly  similar,  and  equivalent  changes  in  price  can  be 
expected to have similar effects across countries.  Finally,  to the extent that 
a  group of products with many substitutes such as cereals tend to have comparable 
support  for  all products  in  the  group,  the  absence  of  specific  attention  to 
substitution will not cause  a  significant bias because  reducing support  from  a 
particular  AMS  formula  should  equally  affect  substitutes  (Cline,  Kawanabe, 
Kronsjo,  and Williams,  1978). 
16 Table  2--Comparing measures  of distortion for wheat  and 
sugar,  1989/90 
Region/commodity  PSEi 
United States: 
Wheat  29.8 
Sugar  14.9 
European  Community: 
Wheat  11.9 
Sugar  15.1 
11  PSEs  as  reported by  the  USDA. 
'5:.1  RTDS  using USDA's  PSEs. 
RTDS2  SRTDS3  MRTDS4 
Percent 
23.3  17.9  13.0 
3.4  2.2  1.0 
11. 9  6.0  6.0 
18.5  13.3  13.5 
~I  RTDS  using USDA's  PSEs  and single commodity version of SWOPSIM  ST89. 
il RTDS  using USDA's  PSEs  and  22-commodity version of  SWOPSIM  ST89. 
Conclusions 
This paper points out the possible dangers in using aggregate measures of support 
as  indices of trade distortion.  These  differences deserve attention given the 
recent  emphasis  accorded  to  AMSs  as  instruments  for  GATT  negotiations  for 
agriculture.  As  the  analysis  indicates,  using  AMSs  as  indicators  of  trade 
distortions  can  be  especially misleading  when  countries  pursue  policies  that 
offset  trade-distortion  effects  of  producer  support.  On  the  other  hand,  if 
support across countries is confined to market support policies,  then an AMS  such 
as the PSE  can provide a  comparable indication of the extent of trade distortion. 
The  TDS  holds  promise  as  an  additional  instrument  of  trade  negotiation  and 
monitoring efforts.  It is a  simple, volume-based method to measure agricultural 
trade  distortion.  It is  consistent with  the  methodology  pursued  in previous 
rounds when tariff cuts were the modus  operandi.  And,  the TDS  directly addresses 
the  trade distortionary implications of domestic  and border policies,  the area 
of primary concern to  the  GATT. 
One  very attractive feature of the  TDS  is that,  unlike more  elaborate modeling 
and trend analysis,  the  TDS  provides negotiators with quick and easy access  to 
the  trade  volume  and  trade  balance  effects  of  liberalization.  In  past  GATT 
rounds,  these  two  effects  formed  the  basis  for  calculating  and  balancing  the 
economic  gains  and  losses  from  policy  concessions.  To  the  extent  that  the 
Uruguay  Round  is  still  likely  to  focus  largely  on  the  trade  effects  of 
agricultural policies,  the  TDS  could provide  a  very useful  gauge  of potential 
trade effects of liberalization. 
There  are  problems  with  the  TDS:  the  information  requirements  are,  in  some 
cases,  greater  than  for  an  AMS,  and  there may  be  controversy  about  the  use  of 
elasticity parameters.  In  our  opinion,  the  additional  information  needed  is 
17 minimal  and is already used in much  country policy analysis.21  We  would hasten 
to point out as well  that elasticity parameters have been employed in previous 
rounds,  and as  long as  their use  is confined to  simple  arithmetic,  as  would be 
the  case  for  the  TDS,  the problem should not be  overwhelming.22 
The  advantages of the TDS  over an AMS  should not mean that aggregate measures of 
support should be ignored as an instrument of negotiation.  We  believe, however, 
that  aggregate  measures  like  the  PSE,  provide  one  viewpoint  of  agricultural 
support  in  the  Uruguay  Round,  and  they  should  be  used  in  conjunction  with  a 
trade-distortion measure like the TDS.  This would ensure that GATT  negotiating 
and  subsequent  monitoring  efforts  address  the  primary  issue  at  hand,  the 
reduction of trade-distorting support policies. 
21Information  on  the  supply  and  demand  elasticities  may  be  the  most 
problematic  data  requirement.  As  a  practical  approximation,  standard 
elasticities (interpreted as weights)  could be agreed upon and used by everyone 
in negotiations. 
22Some  might object to the use of an elasticity in a  TDS  measure  since such 
numbers are considered the habitat of economists.  However,  to the layman,  these 
can  be  considered  "agreed  upon"  weights  which  are  used  to  add  up  the  likely 
impact of a  set of policies.  One  could easily imagine negotiators  and  lawyers 
agreeing upon a  set of weights for different policy components of the  PSE.  For 
example,  there currently seems  to be  agreement  on  a  weight  of 1  for  "included 
policies" (the red list), 0 for excluded policies (the green list), and something 
that must be between  1  and 0  for  other policies. 
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20 Appendix  1:  TDS  Estimates  for Selected Products  and  Countries 
This  appendix presents  TDS  estimates for several products  and countries  (in 
graphical  and numerical  form)  made  from  DECO  data  on  support.  Figure Al  shows 
the  VTDS  measures  implicit in the  DECO  support data for  the United States  and 
the  European  Community. 
Figure A1--Estimated value of trade distorted by  support  (VTDS),  1989/90 
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The  following pages  present graphs  and data for  a  series of products  over 
time.  The  graphs  are stacked bar graphs with the  components  representing  the 
estimated trade distortion contributed by each country.  The  height of all of 
the  contributions  is the  total distortion for  a  year.  The  upper  graph  on 
each page  is in quantity units  and  gives  a  sense of movement  of trade 
distortion  (or  the  lack of it) over  time.  The  quantity axis  is kept  the  same 
for products  groups  meat  and eggs,  grains,  and oi1seeds  to facilitate 
comparisons  across products with  these  groups. 
When  policy support levels,  such as  those  for cereals for  the  EC  and United 
States,  depend  on world market prices,  the  graphs  show  changes  in trade 
distortion over  time.  As  world prices drop,  as  they did in 1986/87,  trade 
distortion increases. 
The  bottom graph  on each page  (data are  shown below  the  graph)  shows  the  share 
of trade distortion  (from  the  top  graph)  contributed by  each country  (the 
totals equal  100%). 
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79  1980  81  82  83  84  1985  86  87  88  89  1990 
Australia -
1  6  5  31  15  6  5  0  0  0  0  0 
Japan  -
331  314  389  413  406  436  463  577  544  578  551  516 
Switz.  0  129  127  135  145  147  153  164  159  164  168  162  163 
Sweden  0  63  65  68  71  74  78  77  76  88  100  97  102 
Austria -
74  86  95  106  118  117  132  123  114  133  125  140 
EEQ-12  0  2813 2979 3407 3610 3732  025 4464 4752 4312 4950 4669 4841 
Canada -
362  325  382  367  340  365  238  424  350  471  420  313 
~ -
3590 3097 4407 4053 3498 4193 2877 4405 4175  4641  443 3729 
TDS data in  table is in 1000 Metric Tons 
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79  1980  81  82  83  84  1985  86 
Australia  illIIIlID  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Japan  m  1118  1215  1347  772  1223  1140  848  1208 
Switz.  D  253  216  231  229  233  248  255  304 
Sweden  0  77  79  102  109  115  103  156  227 
Austria  m  81  87  92  36  115  63  25  258 
~  Austria 
IDIIIIIIIIill  Australia 
PORK 
87  88  89  1990 
0  0  0  0 
1432 1792  1678  1074 
359  339  261  289 
249  204  174  179 
389  308  148  242 
EEQ-12  0  3160 2080 1727 2703  367  980  1764 5723 7335 5370 2614 4208 
Canada -
28  74  0  0  33  4  23  0  0  57  196  75 
u..sA  -
99  -82  0  -17  -3  -29  -20  -15  -7  -17  -77  -62 
TDS data in  table is in 1000 Metric Tons 
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79  1980  81  82  83  84  1985  86  87  88  89  1990 
Australia -
0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Japan  -
276  284  287  302  316  304  315  264  275  284  249  249 
Switz.  D  43  42  42  45  48  49  52  56  62  69  67  67 
Sweden  0  41  36  45  44  43  41  41  52  51  59  58  59 
Austria -
19  20  21  19  16  20  17  20  17  64  80  76 
EEQ-12  D  1673  1320  596  1043 1265  1094  1410  209  28963245 2518  064 
Canada -
115  127  195  180  158  81  55  -23  142  154  154  170 
u..sA  -
-73  -78  0  -95  -104  -45  -69  728  3283  575  104  219 
TOS data in table is in  1000 Metric Tons 
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79  1980  81  82  83  84  1985  86 
Australia -
29  29  15  40  49  12  26  30 
Japan  -
339  336  338  352  352  360  364  380 
Switz.  D  37  34  32  36  39  36  37  43 
Sweden  D  46  40  40  39  32  31  47  69 
Austria -
19  17  20  17  15  18  16  23 
EE~-12  0  717  533  217  -232  316  9  18  1015 
Canada -
31  63  65  60  65  23  35  3 
~ -
-3  -3  0  0  -5  -1  -5  -2 
l11li  Austria 
ffiIIIllIlIlI  Australia 
EGGS 
87  88  89  1990 
12  11  11  11 
427  430  432  406 
42  42  40  37 
74  77  75  65 
20  50  49  51 
761  757  965  403 
25  61  30  17 
339  206  29  33 
TDS  data in  table is in  1000 Metric Tons 
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79  1980  81  82  83  84  1985  86  87  88  89  1990 
Australia  !IIIIIIl  611  827  879  842  657  990  1718  1891  1382  1044  973  1232 
Japan  111m  4971  4489  4331  4160  4858  5265  5911  6708  6668  6627  6551  6739 
Switz.  D  2061  1929  1698  1712  1925  2042  2350  2622  2552  2344  2233  2478 
Sweden  CJ  1526  1380  1237  1145  1263  1690  2062  2098  1963  1865  2017  2249 
Austria -
1391  1380  947  928  2187  1488  1883 
~  D  4590  2400 29545 29173  46661  56616 
Canada  ~  3515  3359  3159  3345  4224  4725 
~ -
27771  26151  24606 2439  27223 33126 
TDS  data in  table is in 1000 Metric Tons 
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Source: Calculated from OECD reports. 
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79  1980  81  82  83  84  1985  88  87  88  89  1990 
Australia  IIIIIID  -325  -5  99  121  254  182  201  1201  19  2  0  0 
Japan  -
2872  2818  2839  2879  2971  3091  3244  3517  3502  3493  3374  3399 
Switz.  D  338  308  308  409  405  428  429  498  512  588  540  480 
Sweden  D  139  143  272  371  300  303  557  948  941  502  883  1124 
Austria  g  240  124  85  210  134  131  272  574  822  719  436  636 
~  0  15158  13002 13080 17227  14249  6841  10818  38231  008232802  16871  27744 
Canada  • 
1084  1471  1913  2187  2845  3111  8032  12385  11103  4596  3271  4149 
u..sA  -
-4267  2280  5403  -574  -188  -1106  4191  19834 21498  750  -678  9081 
TOS data in  table is in 1000 Metric Tons 






79  1980  81  82  83  84  1985  86  87  88  89  1990 
..  USA  ~  Canada  c=J  EC-12 
Cd  Sweden  c=J  Switz.  iB Japan 
Source: Calculated from OECD  reports. 
~  Austria 
[IIllJ]ll]]]  A  u  s t r a Ii a 
COARSE  GRAINS 






79  1980  81  82  83  84  1985  86  87  88  89  1990 
AU8traiia  nmm  3  4  4  8  10  6  6  0  0  0  0  0 
Japan  _  12683  11962  12856 12605  14100  14280 14943 16860  17124  16667 15540  14801 
Switz.  0  904  795  712  857  894  807  872  1007  1060  1228  1084  1081 
Sweden  0  1641  919  666  1683  1075  914  1822  2822  2143  1485  2295  2871 
Austria  _  1328  284  334  1250  -166  898  1282  1723  2401  2066  1381  1235 
~  D  4402  27818  17924  31847 22883 12406 18762 80202  987  43951 31888 44164 
Canada  _  2209  2340  3582  4269 
~  _  -1770  ?o696  4170  2841  17620  5823  12787  72081  745  5921  8929  -5841 
TOS  data in  table is in 1000 Metric Tons 






79  1980  81  82  83  84  1985  86  87  88  89  1990 
~  Canada  CJ  EC-12 
CJ  Sweden  CJ  Switz.  III Japan 
Source: Calculated from OECD reports. 





Australia  IIIlllllll  48  65  60  72  42 
Japan  -
8313  403 5171  7996 8417  8461 9635 
Switz.  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Sweden  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Austria -
0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
E~~-12  0  188  -446  333  482  377  709  1109  1896 
Canada -
0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
!J..SA  -
-25  -20  9  313  352  252  1576 5089 
~  Austria 
illlIlIIIIIIII  Australia 
RICE 
26 
0  0  0  0 
0  0  0  0 
0  0  0  0 
1400  1127  994  1228 
0  0  0  0 
690  2308  533  640 
TDS data in table is in 1000 Metric Tons 
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79  1980  81  82  83  84  1985  86  87  88  89  1990 
Australia -
0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Japan  -
422  296  379  517  312  473  602  601  550  365  362  346 
Switz.  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Sweden  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Austria -
0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
EEQ-12  0  9  7  7  14  27  44  143  824  1512  750  688  942 
Canada -
0  1  6  23  4  2  34  37  2  19  2  42 
~ -
-50  -49  -7  -64  -59  -143  -47  140  -39  918  226  -11 
TOS data in  table is in 1000 Metric Tons 
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79  1980  81  82  83  84  1985  86  87  88  89  1990 
Australia -
0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Japan  .,  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Switz.  D  35  36  38  38  32  32  35  44  47  45  48  45 
Sweden  0  147  169  178  160  120  62  194  302  249  274  370  408 
Austria  ., 
0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
EE~-12  D  272  489  519  924  447  72  586  2473 3316 1930 2661  0 
Canada -
182  172  103  156  168  286  505  996  783  393  281  361 
!.!SA  -
0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
TDS data in table is in 1000 Metric Tons 









79  1980  81  82  83  84  1985  86  87  88  89  1990 
..  USA  ~  Canada  CJ  EC-12 
CJ  Sweden  CJ  Switz.  IB  Japan 
~  Austria 
IDIIIlIIl  Australia 
Source: Calculated from OECD reports. 
REFINED  SUGAR 






79  1980  81  82  83  84  1985  86  87  88  89  1990 
Australia -
-86  -149  -19  149  101  222  270  185  211  200  70  69 
Japan  -
601  526  803  934  896  1004 1008 1055  1013  994  766  725 
Switz.  0  82  68  63  73  89  84  83  85  81  101  94  96 
Sweden  0  71  -7  111  147  133  190  178  195  157  149  106  144 
Austria -
137  63  81  179  152  179  202  160  179  178  204  152 
EEQ-12  0  5453  735  1621  4542 4072 5104 5897  543 6432 5736 4045 4417 
Canada -
26  31  38  60  65  100  155  155  102  119  95  51 
~ -
1248  -26  414  2325  2161  3344 3369 2916  2997 2228 1736 1308 
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